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Abstract
Composite indicators are becoming increasingly influential tools of environmental assessment and advocacy. Nonetheless, their use is controversial as they often rely on ad-hoc and
theoretically problematic assumptions regarding normalization, aggregation, and weighting.
Nonparametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) methods, originating in the productioneconomics literature, have been proposed as a means of addressing these concerns. These
methods dispense with contentious normalization and weighting techniques by focusing on a
measure of best-case relative performance. Recently, the standard DEA model for composite indicators was extended to account for worst-case analysis by Zhou, Ang, and Poh [21]
(hereafter, ZAP). In this note we argue that, while valid and interesting in its own right,
the measure adopted by ZAP may not capture, in a mathematical as well as practical sense,
the notion of worst-case relative performance. By contrast, we focus on the strict worstcase analogue of standard DEA for composite indicators and show how it leads to tractable
optimization problems. Finally, we compare the two methodologies using data from ZAP’s
Sustainable Energy Index case study, demonstrating that they occasionally lead to divergent
results.
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Introduction

Composite indicators are becoming increasingly influential tools of environmental assessment
and advocacy. Usually taking the form of a weighted arithmetic average of normalized indicators, these indices condense complex multidimensional information into a single number. As
such, they are easy to compute and to interpret. Furthermore, they allow for the computation
of rankings to assess the comparative standing of different entities (countries, regions, policies).
This conceptual simplicity facilitates communication with the press and public, and thus aids
in generating awareness regarding the issue that the composite indicator is meant to address.
Despite their increasing popularity, composite indicators are often strongly criticized by
official statisticians and economists, including those interested in the measurement of sustainability (Ravallion [15], Bohringer and Jochem [3]). These critiques come in different varieties,
both conceptual and methodological. On the conceptual side, it is argued that the underlying issues that composite indicators address are often ill-defined and open to excessive interpretation.
Ravallion [15] cites Newsweek magazine’s “best country rankings” as an intuitive example of
this kind of definitional haziness. Statisticians further complain that the process of constructing
a composite index discards useful statistical information by reducing multidimensional data to
an aggregate measure. While we agree that these are important issues, we do not dwell on them
as the focus of this paper is primarily methodological. Here, critics argue that integral modeling
assumptions behind the construction of composite indices such as the choice of normalization
procedure, aggregation function, and weighting scheme, fail to be grounded in economic theory
or a coherent analytic framework (Ravallion [15]). What is more, the ad-hoc nature of these
choices may lead to unintended theoretical consequences such as unacceptable tradeoffs (Ravallion [14]) and problematic measurement-theoretic implications (Ebert and Welsch [12]). Finally,
the indices themselves may be very sensitive to changes in these subjective choices so that any
insights or rankings that are generated can be highly non-robust.
One way of addressing the dependence of composite indices on arbitrary assumptions on
normalization and weighting (while maintaining the linearity of the aggregation function) is via
the nonparametric framework of data envelopment analysis (DEA).1 First developed by Charnes
et al. [5] in the field of production economics, DEA was primarily conceived as a methodology for
measuring the relative efficiency of different decision-making units. Since then, DEA has been
1

It is worth noting that there exist other nonparametric frameworks that impose less restrictive assumptions

on aggregation. This increased generality usually introduces ambiguity to the index results. For instance,
in the context of multidimensional welfare measurement, Anderson et al. [1] impose solely monotonicity and
quasiconcavity on the aggregation function and derive upper and lower bounds on index scores, not precise
values and rankings.
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the subject of extensive research in both economics and operations research [9]. Its application
in composite index construction, known as the “benefit of the doubt” (BOD) method, was
proposed by Cherchye et al. [6]. For each entity (country, region, policy) to be assessed, the
BOD method searches for its “most favorable” set of weights, defined as the maximizers of
the ratio of its score to that of the highest-performing member of the group. Thus, weights
are determined endogenously and may differ between entities. Furthermore, it is important to
note that DEA takes as input non-normalized data and its scores and rankings are invariant
to ratio-scale transformations (i.e., multiplicative changes in units). DEA-like methods are
being increasingly used to build composite indices for a variety of applications ranging from
market structure and technology [6, 8], to gender issues [10], to environmental policy and
assessment [11, 19, 21, 20].
In a recent paper Zhou, Ang and Poh. [21] (hereafter, ZAP) extended the DEA framework
of Cherchye et al. [7] to account for worst-case analysis. In particular, they propose a model with
which to compute an entity’s “least favorable weights” and corresponding worst-case relative
performance. The yardstick of performance becomes the ratio of an entity’s score to that of the
worst member in the group. They then go on to propose a hybrid DEA methodology in which
convex combinations of their normalized best- and worst-case DEA scores are considered.
Using ZAP’s work as a springboard we argue that, while interesting in its own right, the
worst-case measure that they adopt may not capture, in a mathematical as well as practical
sense, the notion of worst-case relative performance. We propose an alternative measure that
is, in a strict mathematical sense, the worst-case analogue of the BOD model of Cherchye
et al. [6]. While the mathematical structure of this measure differs significantly to that of the
BOD method, we show how it can nonetheless be tractably computed, even under general convex
restrictions on the weights.2 We then compare the two methodologies using data from ZAP’s
Sustainable Energy Index case study, demonstrating that they occasionally lead to notably
different results.
Paper outline.

The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets up the formal model

and relevant DEA framework. It goes on to discuss ZAP’s approach to modeling worst-case
relative performance and to suggest, by means of a stylized example, how it may result in
undesirable conclusions. Section 3 introduces and analyzes an alternative optimization problem
that is the strict worst-case analogue of traditional DEA for composite indices. Section 4 applies
2

An additional advantage of the proposed approach is that it results in worst-case DEA scores that share a

similar 0-1 scale to that of best-case DEA scores. Thus, there is no need for potentially contentious normalization
procedures when taking the aforementioned convex combinations of best- and worst-case DEA scores.

3

the proposed procedure to the case study of the original ZAP paper, showing how the two
methodologies can lead to divergent results. Section 5 provides conclusions. All mathematical
proofs, tables, and figures are collected in the Appendix.
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Model Description

Suppose we are given a set A = {a1 , a2 , ..., aA } of A agents and a set I = {i1 , i2 , ..., iI }
of I indicators. Moreover let xai denote agent a’s value for indicator i. All indicator values

xai for a ∈ A and i ∈ I are assumed to be positive. Indicators are weighted with a nonnegative column vector of weights w ∈ <I+ , where wi denotes the weight assigned to indicator

i. Consistent to classical DEA, an agent a’s score under weights w is given by the corresponding
PI
weighted sum of the non-normalized indicators:
i=1 wi xai .
Now, let us introduce the main concept behind the use of DEA-like methods in composite
indicators. Consider an individual agent aj ∈ A and suppose that weights w are chosen. The
relative standing of this agent among her peers, given the chosen weights w, is captured via the
ratio of her performance to that of the highest-performing agent of group A. Denoting it by a
function fa (w), it equals:

PI

faj (w) ≡

wi xaj i
.
PI
maxa∈A i=1 wi xai
i=1

(1)

Eq. (1) ranges between 0 and 1; the higher it is, the closer agent aj is to the top performer.
If it equals 1, then for this choice of w , agent aj has the top score. The DEA approach to the
construction of composite indicators uses exactly this measure of relative standing as its measuring stick of performance. In particular, it searches for the set of weights that maximize the
function fa (w), for each agent a ∈ A. Applied to agent aj , it solves the following optimization
problem:

fa∗j

PI

≡ max faj (w) = max
w≥0

w≥0

wi xaj i
PI
maxa∈A i=1 wi xai
i=1

(2)

Optimization problem (2) determines the weights, subject to a non-negativity constraint,
resulting in the best-case relative performance of agent aj . These are known as the “most
favorable weights” for agent aj .
From a mathematical standpoint, the tractability of problem (2) is crucially dependent on
the fact that it may be reduced to the following, equivalent linear-fractional program:
fa∗j

PI
= max

i=1

w≥0,z

s.t.

I
X
i=1

4

w i xaj i
z

wi xai ≤ z, a ∈ A,

(3)

which, in turn, can be shown to be equivalent (see section 4.5.2 in Boyd and Vandenberghe [4])
to the linear program
fa∗j

= max
w≥0

s.t.

I
X

wi xaj i

i=1
I
X

wi xai ≤ 1, for all a ∈ A.

(4)

i=1

Linear program (4) is the familiar “benefit of the doubt” method for composite indicators
discussed in Cherchye et al. [7] and applied in many contexts since [21, 16, 8, 6, 13, 10].
Importantly, additional linear constraints may be imposed to the weights in optimization
problem (2) at no conceptual or computational cost. Particularly compelling weight restrictions
come in the form of so-called “pie shares” (see Cherchye et al. [7, 6]), which set lower and upper
bounds on the contribution of any single indicator to the agent’s total score. To wit, given a
set of numbers Li , Ui for all i ∈ I the corresponding pie-share constraints to be appended to
problem (2), and ultimately also to its linear equivalent (4), are given by

Li ≤ PI

wi xaj i

k=1

wk xaj k

≤ Ui , for all i ∈ I.

(5)

The above constraints hold theoretical as well as practical appeal. Theoretically, their imposition does not compromise the very desirable property of ratio-scale invariance of DEA, also
known as “units invariance” [9, 7]. That is, DEA scores and their resulting rankings remain
unchanged under incomparable (i.e., non-identical across indicators) ratio-scale transformations
of the original indicators. This property is particularly compelling in the case of environmental
indices (Ebert and Welsch [12]). Meanwhile, on a practical level pie shares are pure numbers
whose meaning is easy to grasp and on whose values experts can usually come to an agreement [7, 6].
The worst-case model of ZAP. ZAP take as a starting point the above standard DEA
model and extend it to account for worst-case relative performance. Considering again an agent

aj ∈ A, they draw on previous work by Zhu [22] and Takemura and Tone [18] and (implicitly) define this agent’s “least favorable weights” as the solution of the following optimization
problem:

PI

gaZAP
j

≡ min
w≥0

wi xaj i
.
PI
mina∈A i=1 wi xai
i=1

(6)

That is, they define the worst-case DEA weights to be such that they minimize the ratio
of an agent’s performance to that of the worst-case performer in the group. Optimization
problem (6) retains the nice properties of problem (2) in that it too can be reduced to a
linear-fractional program, and ultimately to the following linear program (which, in turn, is the
5

formulation that appears in ZAP’s work):
= min
gaZAP
j

w≥0

s.t.

I
X

wi xaj i

i=1
I
X

wi xai ≥ 1, a ∈ A.

(7)

i=1

In a formal sense, problem (6), and thus also its linear equivalent (7), does not correspond to
worst-case DEA for composite indicators. This is because it abandons the measure of relative
performance faj (w) of Eq. (1), which constitutes the objective function of problem (2), in favor
of an alternative measure, namely

PI

gaj (w) ≡

wi xaj i
.
PI
mina∈A i=1 wi xai
i=1

(8)

The ratio gaj (w) is no smaller than 1 and unbounded above; the smaller it is, the closer agent

aj is to the bottom performer. If it equals 1, then for this choice of w, agent aj has the worst
score. Thus, worst-case DEA as defined by ZAP searches for the set of weights w that minimize
the ratio gaj (w).
While problem (6) is interesting in its own right, and the underlying optimization problem
has identical structure to the standard DEA context (and is thus readily solvable using similar
techniques), it is not the worst-case analogue of standard DEA. Moreover, it may sometimes
fail to capture the essence of worst-case relative performance. The following, highly stylized,
example illustrates this fact.
Example 1 [counter-intuitive implications of ZAP’s model].

Consider the setting

described in Table 1 summarizing an instance of the problem for A = {a1 , a2 } and I = {i1 , i2 }.
i1

i2

a1

9999

1

a2

5000

5000

Table 1: xai values for Example 1.

The standard best-case DEA model of Eq. (2) results in identical scores for a1 and a2 , since

fa∗1 = fa∗2 = 1. Let us now consider worst-case performance. According to ZAP’s model of
Eq. (6), agents a1 and a2 are equal as they both get the absolute minimum score of 1. This is
because there exist weight vectors that equalize their performance (e.g., w = (1/2, 1/2)0 ), thus
implying that they are simultaneously the worst performers of the two-member group A. By
definition of problem (6), this means that they both get the worst possible score, i.e., gaZAP
=
1
6

gaZAP
= 1, and so ZAP’s methodology cannot discriminate between them. This result does not,
2
arguably, accord with intuition. Indeed, we would expect agent a2 ’s balanced performance across
indicators, in combination with a1 ’s extremely unbalanced one, to be recognized and rewarded.
Furthermore, note that the exact numbers here are not important. Similar results would obtain
if we make xa1 i1 ≥ 0 as large and xa1 i2 ≥ 0 as small as we like, and set xa1 i1 + xa1 i2 =

xa2 i1 + xa2 i2 and xa2 i1 = xa2 i2 .
Finally, in order to construct a DEA measure combining best- and worst-case performance,
ZAP normalize the results of (2) and (6) via max-min rescaling. This is necessary because the
scales of the two measures clearly differ; one ranges from 0 to 1, the other from 1 to +∞. This
normalization introduces an undesirable source of subjectivity, which arguably goes against the
normalization-free essence of DEA. In any event, given an agent aj and λ ∈ [0, 1], ZAP propose
to consider the following family of convex combinations of normalized best- and worst-case DEA
scores:
CIaZAP
(λ) = λ
j

fa∗j − mina∈A fa∗
maxa∈A fa∗ − mina∈A fa∗

+ (1 − λ)

gaZAP
− mina∈A gaZAP
j
maxa∈A gaZAP − mina∈A gaZAP

.

(9)

We close this section by noting that, while relatively recent, ZAP’s model has already been
quite influential in the literature. Indeed, a number of studies have adopted ZAP’s approach to
worst-case DEA for the construction of composite indices (see Rogge [16], Hatefi and Torabi [13],
Dominguez-Serrano and Blancas [10], among others).
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An alternative approach to worst-case DEA

An alternative way of modeling worst-case relative performance is to maintain the structure of
optimization problem (2) (i.e., its objective function and constraints) but make it a minimization
as opposed to a maximization. This would involve solving the following optimization problem:

ga∗j ≡ min
w≥0

PI

wi xaj i
.
PI
maxa∈A i=1 wi xai
i=1

(10)

Problem (10) is the strict worst-case analogue of problem (2). Not surprisingly, when applied
to the data of Example 1 it clearly points to a2 ’s far superior worst-case relative performance
since we have ga∗2 = 5000/9999 vs. ga∗1 = 1/5000).
Analytically, problem (10) is not as straightforward as (2) or (6). This is because we cannot
do the same trick of Eq. (3) to reduce it to an equivalent linear-fractional program. Nonetheless,
it is possible to argue from first principles that it too admits a simple and tractable solution.
For expository reasons, before going into the statement and proofs of the following results,
we generalize Eq. (10) to incorporate arbitrary constraints on the weights. Letting Wj ⊆ <I+
7

denote an arbitrary subset of the non-negative orthant, define the optimization problem:

ga∗j (Wj )

PI

≡ min

w∈Wj

wi xaj i
.
PI
maxa∈A i=1 wi xai
i=1

(11)

The pie-share bounds of Eqs. (5) correspond to sets Wj that are polyhedra, i.e., they can be
expressed as systems of linear inequalities (see Chapter 2 in Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis [2]). This
is because Eqs. (5) are equivalent to the system of linear inequalities

(

wi xaj i − Li

I
X

wk xaj k ≥ 0, wi xaj i − Ui

k=1

I
X

)

wk xaj k ≤ 0 , for all i ∈ I.

k=1

We are now ready to state the paper’s first theorem.

Theorem 1 Consider optimization problem (11) with m linear constraints on the weights
given by Wj = {w ∈ <I : w ≥ 0, Gj · w ≤ hj }, where Gj ∈ <m×I and hj ∈ <m . We
have
ga∗j (Wj )

= min
a∈A








min
w≥0, y≥0


j

G w−hj y≤0

P
I
i=1

I
X

wi xaj i

i=1

wi xai =1








.

(12)







Proof. See Appendix.
Theorem 1 establishes that problem (11) is highly tractable for arbitrary polyhedral restrictions on weights. Indeed, its solution simply amounts to solving A linear programs, the
inner minimizations of Eq. (12) for each a ∈ A, and picking the optimal solution which is the
smallest. Specifically, this means that the pie-share weight restrictions of Eq. (5) can be easily
accommodated in problem (10).
Corollary 1 establishes an easy consequence of Theorem 1. In particular, when there are
no constraints on the weights, problem (11) can be trivially solved by simply enumerating the
ratios

xaj i
xai

for all i ∈ I and a ∈ A and picking the minimum value.

Corollary 1 Consider the setting of Theorem 1 with no constraints on the weights except
for non-negativity (i.e., Wj = <I+ ). In this case Eq. (12) can be simplified to:
ga∗j (<I+ ) ≡ ga∗j = min

a∈A, i∈I

xaj i
.
xai

(13)

Let I ∗ denote the set of indicators that attain the minimum in Expression (13). Any
P
vector wa∗j ≥ 0 such that i∈I ∗ wa∗j i∗ > 0 for i∗ ∈ I ∗ and wa∗j i = 0 otherwise, is an
optimal solution of problem (10) .
Finally, it is worth noting that the positive result of Theorem 1 extends to the case of
arbitrary convex constraints, which has not been previously mentioned in the DEA literature.
8

Theorem 2 Consider optimization problem (11) for an arbitrary set Wj . We have
)
(
PI
i=1 wi xaj i
∗
.
(14)
gaj (Wj ) = min min PI
a∈A
w∈Wj
i=1 wi xai
If Wj can be written as Wj = {w ∈ <I+ : ck (w) ≤ 0, k = 1, 2, .., K}, where ck (·) for
k = 1, 2, ..., K are convex functions, then the inner minimizations of Eq. (14) are concave
fractional programs that can be efficiently solved with standard methods.
Proof. See Appendix.
In conclusion, the analytic results of this section establish that problem (11), in addition
to being the (generalized) worst-case equivalent of (2), is highly tractable.

4

Numerical case study

In this section, we apply the framework developed in Section 3 to the original case study of ZAP.
In their paper, Zhou and his co-authors applied their DEA methodology to the construction of
a sustainable energy index (SEI) for the eighteen Asia Pacific Economic Development (APEC)
economies in 2002. In what follows, we offer a bare-bones description of ZAP’s SEI, omitting
details on how the index was developed. This is because our primary objective is to briefly
compare the results obtained under the two different DEA methodologies.
The three building blocks of ZAP’s SEI are an energy efficiency indicator (EEI), a renewable energy indicator (REI), and a climate change indicator (CCI). The EEI is the reciprocal
of the energy-to-GDP ratio, the REI is the percentage of renewable energy in total final energy
consumption, and the CCI is the reciprocal of the CO2 emissions-to-GDP ratio. More information on the rationale and data sources of the SEI can be found in Section 4 of ZAP. Table 2
summarizes data on the EEIs, REIs, and CCIs of the 18 APEC countries.

[Table 2 here]
Application of DEA methodologies.

We begin by considering the simplest possible DEA

setting in which there are no weight restrictions. Table 3 summarizes the results of the various
DEA models for this case.3

[Table 3 here]
The second column of Table 3 collects the results of best-case DEA scores as defined by
Eq. (2) (which are of course identical to those cited in ZAP) along with the ranks they imply.
3

All computations in this section were performed in MATLAB. Details and programs available upon request.
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The third column collects the results of ZAP’s worst-case DEA scores as per Eq. (6), while the
fourth column summarizes the worst-case DEA scores proposed in this paper as per Eq. (10).
The fifth column lists the average of the normalized values of Columns 2 and 3, i.e., the values
of Eq. (9) for λ = 1/2; the sixth column does the same for Columns 2 and 4, i.e using the
worst-case DEA scores of this paper.4
Examining Table 3 we see that the choice of model (6) versus model (10) results in numerous
rank changes (indicated in red). Some of them can be quite dramatic, like for instance those
involving Russia, which is last according to model (6) and 12th according to model (10). Indeed,
to elucidate the differences between the two methodologies it is instructive to focus on Russia
and contrast its performance to that of Korea. Under model (6) Russia and Korea are considered
equal as there exist weight vectors that result in their having the minimum score in group A
the optimal solutions of (6) for Korea and
and waZAP
of APEC countries. Denoting by waZAP
18
17
Russia respectively, we have

= (0.01, 1.52, 0.03)0 , waZAP
= (0.22, 0.01, 0.49)0 .
waZAP
17
18
Conversely, under model (10) we see that Korea has a far inferior worst-case performance to
Russia. The optimal weights provide insight as to why. Denoting by wa∗17 and wa∗18 the optimal
solutions of (10) for Korea and Russia respectively, we have

wa∗17 = (0, K1 , 0), waZAP
= (0, 0, K2 ), for any K1 , K2 > 0.
18
Hence, we see that for Korea (Russia), worst-case weights correspond to those assigning positive
weight exclusively to indicator EEI (CCI). The result now follows since Korea’s performance
of 0.6 in EEI (where New Zealand has the maximum value of 56.9) is, in relative terms, worse
than that of Russia which has a CCI value of 0.652 (where Papua has the maximum value of
5.039).
Qualitatively similar implications persist even when we impose the uniform pie-share bounds

(Li , Ui ) = (L, U ) = (0.1, 0.5) for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, albeit to a weaker degree. Table 4 summarizes the corresponding results.

[Table 4 here]
4

That is, it lists the values of CIa∗ (1/2) for all a ∈ A, where
CIa∗j (λ) ≡ λ

fa∗j − mina∈A fa∗
maxa∈A fa∗ − mina∈A fa∗

+ (1 − λ)

ga∗j − mina∈A ga∗
maxa∈A ga∗ − mina∈A ga∗

.

(15)

Note that, unlike ZAP, the above normalization is not necessary because the ga∗j measures defined in Eq. (10)
are already scaled to range between 0 and 1. Nonetheless, we still adopt it to maximize comparability of the two
sets of results.
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Combining best- and worst-case DEA scores.

Examining the fifth and sixth columns of

Tables 3 and 4, we see that the rankings implied by the two methodologies converge significantly
when we consider the averages of the respective normalized DEA scores, as per Eqs. (9) and (15).
Taking this analysis further, Figure 1 follows the example of ZAP’s Figures 2 and 3 and presents
box plots of country ranks when λ is allowed to assume all values in {0, 0.1., 0.2., ..., 0.9, 1}, for
both cases of unconstrained and constrained weights. As expected, we observe greater variability
in country ranks for the worst-case DEA model of Eq. (15) compared to that of (9). The effect
is stronger when weights are unrestricted, but persists even upon setting the aforementioned
pie shares.

[Figure 1 here]
In conclusion, this brief empirical exercise suggests that indices combining best- and worstcase DEA scores are quite sensitive to how one chooses to model worst-case relative performance.

5

Conclusion

This note has revisited the concept of worst-case performance in a nonparametric DEA framework, first introduced in the composite-indicator literature by Zhou, Ang, and Poh [21] (ZAP).
We argue that, while interesting and valid in its own right, the worst-case measure adopted
by ZAP does not capture, in a formal sense, the notion of worst-case DEA performance. By
means of a stylized example, we showed that this theoretical inconsistency may at times lead
to undesirable implications. We analyze the strict worst-case analogue of standard DEA and
show how it can be tractably computed, even under general convex restrictions on the weights.
Furthermore, the resulting worst-case DEA scores can be combined with their best-case analogues without requiring prior normalization. The two methodologies are compared using ZAP’s
Sustainable Energy Index case study, demonstrating that they occasionally lead to divergent
results.
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Appendix
A1: Proofs
Consider optimization problem (11). Let w ∗ be its optimal solution and a∗ be

Theorem 1.

the agent attaining the maximum in the denominator. By definition, we have

PI
w ∗ xa i
wi xaj i
= PIi=1 i∗ j
min
PI
w∈Wj max
a∈A
i=1 wi xai
i=1 wi xa∗ i
(
)
PI
PI
i=1 wi xaj i
i=1 wi xaj i
≥ min PI
≥ min min PI
. (16)
w∈Wj
a∈A
inWj
i=1 wi xa∗ i
i=1 wi xai
PI

i=1

On the other hand,

(

PI

wi xaj i
min min Pi=1
I
a∈A
w∈Wj
i=1 wi xai

)

(

PI

i=1 wi xaj i
≥ min min
PI
a∈A
w∈Wj max
a∈A
i=1 wi xai
PI
i=1 wi xaj i
= min
.
PI
w∈Wj max
w
x
a∈A
i
ai
i=1

)

(17)

Putting inequalities (16)-(17) together we obtain the equality

PI

wi xaj i
= min
min
PI
a∈A
w∈Wj max
a∈A
i=1 wi xai

(

i=1

PI

min

w∈Wj

i=1 wi xaj i
PI
i=1 wi xai

)

.

(18)

Now since Wj is a polyhedral set with Wj = {w ∈ <I : w ≥ 0, Gj w ≤ hj }, for a given

a ∈ A the minimization problem inside the brackets of Eq. (18) is a linear-fractional problem
that can be transformed into the following equivalent linear program (see Section 4.3.2 in Boyd
and Vandenberghe [4]):

min

I
X

w≥0, y≥0
Gj w−hj y≤0 i=1
PI
i=1 wi xai =1

Corollary 1.

wi xaj i .

(19)

Recall Eq. (19) and suppose Gj = 0 and hj = 0. By standard LP theory (Bert-

simas and Tsitsiklis [2]), the optimal solution of (19) will be attained (perhaps non-uniquely)
at one of the extreme points of polytope {w ∈ <I : w ≥ 0,

PI

i=1

wi xai = 1}. The ex-

treme points of this polytope are given by the set of I vectors {w ∗ ∈ <I : wi∗ =

1
,
xai

wk∗ =

0 for all k 6= i}. Thus, finding the optimal solution of (19) is equivalent to enumerating the
terms

xaj i
xai

for i = 1, 2, ...I , and picking the smallest. Hence, when Wj = <I+ , problem (11) is

equivalent to

min min
a∈A i∈I
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xiaj
.
xia

Theorem 2.

Eq. (14) is obtained by simply repeating Steps (16)-(17)-(18) in the proof of

Theorem 1 (note that they are not in any way dependent on the structure of sets Wj ). The
second part of the Theorem follows from well-known results on concave fractional programming
(see Schaible and Shi [17]).5

A2: Tables and Figures not in main text

Table 2: SEI data (see Zhou et al. [21] for data sources.)

Table 3: Best- and worst-case DEA scores for SEI case study (unconstrained weights).
5

Note that both the numerator and denominator of the inner minimization of Eq. (14) are affine non-zero

functions.
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Table 4: Best- and worst-case DEA scores for SEI case study (constrained weights).

Figure 1: Box-plots of SEI ranks when λ ∈ {0, 0.1., ..., 0.9, 1}. Red lines indicate median values, while
gray boxes (black lines) denote 25th -75th (5th -95th ) percentile intervals. Left (right) panels refer to the
unconstrained (constrained) weights case. Upper (lower) panels plot the results corresponding to Eq. (9)
(resp., Eq. (15))
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